The challenges for family law and  family rigths in the changing european societies by Garrido Gómez, María Isabel
 
 
 
 
 
 
Papeles el tiempo de los derechos 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE CHALLENGES FOR FAMILY LAW AND FAMILY RIGHTS  
      IN THE CHANGING EUROPEAN SOCIETIES 
 
                      M.ª ISABEL GARRIDO GÓMEZ 
                                   University of Alcalá  
 
 
 
 
KEY WORDS: Family, family law, family rights, European societies  
 
 
Número: 18           Año: 2010
Reconocimiento – NoComercial – SinObraDerivada (by-nc-nd)
 No se permite un uso comercial de la obra original ni la generación de obras derivadas.
 1
 
 
 
THE CHALLENGES FOR FAMILY  LAW AND FAMILY                
 RIGHTS IN  THE CHANGING EUROPEAN SOCIETIES1 
 
                    M.ª ISABEL GARRIDO GÓMEZ 
                                  University of Alcalá  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Family Law and family rights are, without doubt, currently undergoing changes 
in that underlying values have been inverted. Major differences can however be 
observed and different models prevail in the contemporary States. There are four 
separate options, in fact, according to whether one adopts a view based on 
liberalism/authoritarianism or on egalitarianism/non-egalitarianism: the absolute nuclear 
family, the egalitarian nuclear family, the birth family and the community family. 
Family Law and family rights can be said to revolve around these principles.  This essay 
therefore examines equality with regard to drafting legislation in the light of both 
dimensions and considers the current tendency to specify the rights of the family. The 
essay concludes with an analysis of some of those rights and setting out the cultural and 
ideological, political and economic issues that necessarily serve to question the subject 
of this study. 
 
1. FAMILY LAW AND FAMILY RIGHTS IN A NEW LIGHT  
The subject of family crops up again and again whenever the desire to examine 
realities that have undergone profound change arises. The family unit has effectively 
changed in modern times and can be constituted and structured in a variety of ways.  
Movements that have in some way affected that process of change have sprung up in 
this regard right across Europe, albeit at different times. Reference is made to a menu of 
variations on family life, from which to choose the desired variation. Families range 
from matrimony, with or without children, common law couples, single parent families, 
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reconstituted families, etc.  There are also para-style families and homes that are not 
family-based.  
 
 The predominant structure within the European Union, furthermore, despite the 
manner in which domestic structures are evolving, is the family home.  These variations 
on family units however differ according to the different areas.  The proven extent of 
that diversity provides a mirror image of the overriding values so important in family 
structures, with economic, cultural, technological, employment, town planning and 
social changes having a particularly strong effect (Commaille 1986; Garrido 2000). 
 
  Clearly, along the lines of these observations, Europe came into being as a 
separate entity arising out of historical-cultural factors poured into a diverse 
anthropological mix and in addition to this there is the desire to introduce different 
family models as appropriate to the implosion of immigrant settlers who embody quite 
different ethical values. Judicial and political protective mechanisms have come about 
as a result of the right of such people to autonomy and personal freedom. Nevertheless, 
and pursuant to the line of reasoning used here, there is a need to establish boundaries 
based on dignity as a pillar of judicial order, to link justice, society and human rights 
together and to design Law that will enable families to realise their full potential 
(Fernández García 1995). 
          
 It can therefore be said that the de-institutionalisation of marriage is currently 
occurring while at the same time marriage is becoming contract-based, privatised and 
lacks clear jurisdiction. Secularisation separates the religious aspect from the temporal 
and that does not amount to opposition.  Marriage is deemed to be a voluntary formal 
agreement giving rise to judicial effects. This is fundamentally important to the partners 
in a marriage and only of secondary importance to their groups of origin; regulating 
both the social-financial effects and personal aspects of the spouses involved. The 
aforesaid voluntary agreement establishes the requirements necessary to commence, 
exercise and terminate the marriage -as well as requirements for suspension (by 
separation) or for dissolving the marriage (by divorce) on grounds of certain breaches-. 
The fact that divorce is now allowed under Member State legal systems effectively 
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reflects the importance of affection and serves in practice to move away from the 
nuclear family toward a different type of single-parent or reconstituted family unit 
(Carbonnier 2001; Meulders-Klein and Théry 1993). 
 
One should however point out that the institutionalisation of de factum 
relationships came about in an attempt to separate legal matrimony from its sacred 
nature and to alter the configuration, given that subjection of the will of the parties to 
previously regulated legal standards was seen as an attack on personal freedom. 
Traditionally, the most widespread argument to justify the failure to acknowledge 
common law couples as a legal principle was that they went against morality, public 
order and good practice. Along those lines, although such couples are clearly no longer 
subject to the same level of criticism as to their immoral nature, traditional underlying 
family values effectively mean that married couples continue to receive preferential 
treatment in Law (Bradley 1996; Estrada 1991; Villagrasa 1996).  
 
The fact that women are currently gaining equality with men in the eyes of the 
law and share authority both within the family group and over the children is also 
significant. An internal process of democratisation has taken place in this regard 
brought about by a weakening and decentralisation of masculine power. Nevertheless, 
and despite the fact that this is so, sentiments are still largely seen as a feminine 
stronghold and the man deemed to represent everything external to the home. While it is 
true to say that women are now protected under law and although there has been a move 
toward material equality, this is not yet fully in place. Nevertheless and notwithstanding 
these points, femininity is still largely seen as the stronghold of sentiment and the man 
as embodying factors outside the home. Women are protected in so far as their rights are 
concerned and yet, despite certain material improvement, absolute equality has yet to be 
achieved (Dornbusch and  Strober 1988). 
 
Child-bearing occurs predominantly in matrimony, although this does not 
preclude the unanimous protection of childhood and youth and acknowledgment of their 
rights, whatever their parental background. The rule of thumb is that children of 
marriages and children born outside marriage are deemed equal, the parents having 
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identical duties and the offspring similar rights. Adoption has become particularly 
important in this regard as a way for childless couples or couples seeking to enlarge 
their family to have children lawfully and is equally important for abandoned children. 
Legislation has clearly followed a trend to treat biological and adoptive families 
equally, requiring minors to be treated as active, involved and creative citizens, bearing 
in mind that all decisions are intended to help the child develop its personality to the full 
(Calvo 1994). 
 
From the legal point of view the provisions set down under European Law on 
family issues are not complete but rather comprise isolated regulations and it is 
therefore more appropriate to analyse national Laws. National Constitutions are set 
down in terms that acknowledge family reality and order public authorities to protect 
and support that reality, as appropriate to a Welfare State within which the application 
of Law is often transferred to the political arena in a confusing manner (Bainham and 
Pearl 1993). Furthermore, both Civil Law, intended to conserve and to adapt, and 
Administrative Law, at the forefront of the battle against precariousness and exclusion 
arising out of changes in family behaviour, serve as particularly important legal 
benchmarks. There is an outer circle of conditioning legislation revolving around that 
nucleus: Constitutional Law, as mentioned above, Criminal Law, Procedural Law, 
Private international Law, Tax and Social legislation. As a final point in this regard, 
international effectiveness is dependent on the Constitutions and judicial practices of 
each particular Member State, while international instruments assist at the same time in 
overcoming difficulties inherent in the various ways that national guarantees operate 
(Cretney and Masson 1997; Dewar 1992; Hantrais 1992).   
 
Having thus established the parameters in which current Family Law must 
operate it is important to note that the connection between the subjective and the 
human/familiarity cannot be set aside without denying the primary function of Law, 
namely, to protect and to promote personal identity. Law provides a channel for social 
freedom and guarantees the outcomes sought by citizens through the allocation of 
responsibility. Seen from those viewpoints, if homes are to be organised according to 
the social, political, moral and/or religious principles of family members, then the 
family is provided space as freedom to develop its personality and its inherent rights as 
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well as an intimate space in which the boundaries between  public and private action are 
specified. A sense of privacy therefore becomes a social value and family privacy a 
protective barrier (Béjar 1995; Glendon 1996).   
 
One can in reality consider that private autonomies converge within family 
autonomy along agreed lines in a process of contractualisation of rights and obligations. 
Official Law is subservient to the internal standards created within any given group in 
the event of danger or insufficiency for the purpose of guaranteeing that family goals 
are attained by means of indispensable standards. This effectively amounts to the 
creation of an area of public order within Private Law with a set of factors that are 
neither particularly consistent nor very clear and that must not be breached given the 
social interest in ensuring the family is able to carry out its particular roles. Such 
standards are irrevocable in that, although the individuals may or may cause a legal 
relationship to occur, what they certainly cannot do is to avoid the legal imperative 
imposed upon them, other than in exceptional cases and to a very limited degree 
(Fortino 1997; Hayes and Williams 1999; Millard 1995). A review of Family Law in 
this regard takes us from the concepts of Private Law under Rome and the era of 
Protestant Reform, to the realm of Public Law. Private law has, at the same time, gained 
greater influence since the very different view held in the 18th century, when Private 
Law was seen as the origin of Public Law, giving rise to freedom of the individual and 
regulation of the Welfare State. Changes are currently being proposed in view of the 
smaller family circle and the greater degree of responsibility being taken on by social 
organisations fulfilling traditional purposes (Castán 1994; Coing 1996).  
 
We can therefore see that legal standards act as incentives to decision making for 
future action and laws themselves determine the scope and effects of family 
relationships in detail (Commaille 1991; Díez-Picazo 1984). In other words, any 
agreements reached by dint of the autonomous will of the parties concerned will, in 
theory, have to adapt to the impediments of the legal system given that legal power is 
instrumental. The problem arises in that the ethical content of those legal powers, built 
on religion, ideology, tradition and values, holds great sway and it can be difficult to 
achieve consensus on issues such as marriage, divorce and child custody (Doria 1996). 
Furthermore, equality in the eyes of the legal rules out any discrimination and attempts 
 6
to bring about a minimum level of security of material circumstance. The rules 
regarding equality are general in nature and specify that no-one should be excluded yet, 
insofar as sharing common assets is concerned, that equality does not suffice as it is 
neither real nor effective. The right to social services assistance and to safety is 
conceived as expressing the family interests and on that basis, therefore, individuals 
must be dealt with in such a way as to achieve satisfactory togetherness with the other 
members of the family group (Bobbio 2000).  
 
2. EQUALITY WHEN DRAFTING FAMILY LAW AND FAMILY 
RIGHTS LEGISLATION. A FUNDAMENTAL YET CONTROVERSIAL 
ASPECT 
Equality as a legal imperative when drafting legislation does not mean that all 
are equal under every viewpoint. That would simply render the legal standards 
inoperable and would do away with provisions that are necessary if legal powers of 
jurisdiction are to be exercised. Similarly, one cannot simply require equality to be 
carried out across all natural qualities and de facto situations in which people find 
themselves (Alexy 2001). What is more, as already highlighted, equality under Law 
provides that no arbitrary differences may be established unless rational grounds exist to 
justify such differences. That prohibition is directed at the legislator, who is bound to 
abide by the rule.  
 
It could therefore be argued that equality of this type is not an absolute, but 
rather implies an absence of any discrimination based on significant criteria that have 
been positively prohibited. This is why one finds inequalities within general legal 
standards intended to assist disadvantaged persons, based on the so-called principle of 
social equality or of levelling conditions to compensate for inequalities (Pennock and 
Chapman 2006).   
 
The legal imperative to treat the equal equally and the unequal unequally can be 
used by the legislator taking a universalistic view according to which “valid for all x 
where x has properties P1,P2 ….. Pn, and that judicial consequence C must therefore be 
applicable to x”. What this equates to, however, is a formula which is valid for the 
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legislator and for those applying Law of a formal nature and that must nevertheless be 
interpreted as a requirement aimed at the content of legislation as if it were a mandate 
for material equality. This, according to Alexy, imbues the often disregarded formula 
with a degree of importance regarding two interrelated issues: “whether and to what 
extent it is possible to provide rational grounds for necessary value judgments under the 
framework of the maxim of equality” and “who within the legal system is to have 
jurisdictional competence to formulate such value judgments, in the last instance and as 
binding in Law: the legislator or the Constitutional Court?” (Alexy 2001). 
 
On the basis of the legal principles set out above, the legislator is bound to the 
principle of equality to a lesser degree than the judge in that the former has a greater 
general margin for action. In practice it is easy to see how the legislator continually 
introduces differences in treatment and grants benefits or allocates responsibilities to 
certain groups. The question then becomes “how can one reconcile that apparent 
contradiction?” The answer lies in being reasonable. In this sense, European Court of 
Human Rights case law upholds that any inequality must be based on objective and 
reasonable grounds, that is to say that it must pursue a constitutionally legitimate 
purpose and that it should be possible to discern such justification by considering 
reasonableness and objectivity, pursuant to generally accepted criteria and value 
judgments and to proportionality of the means used and the purposes and effects sought 
by differentiated treatment set down in Law, requiring the application of logic (Bilbao 
and Rey 2003). 
 
That Law is defined as being both general and abstract is, clearly, one of the 
most representative definitions of the liberal Nation which, arising as it does out of the 
collective will, is then defined according to a series of general mandates. That type of 
structure establishes a mode of regulation in which the legislator considers classes and 
categories of individuals and scenarios. The general nature of such regulation has to do 
with the impersonal nature of legal regulation and abstraction with an indeterminate 
number of scenarios or de facto situations of the same kind (Galiana 2007; Marcilla 
2005). The legal consequences provided for under the legal regulations arise in any 
given circumstances where the conditions for application or the de facto situations 
occur. General legal provisions therefore serve to bring value to formal equality. The 
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formula which States that all are equal in the eyes of the law comes about due to the 
general nature of legal regulations involved in the provision of justice according to 
Aristotle. It also, however, brings other values, such as impartiality, into play (Bobbio 
1990).   
 
Generality and abstraction furthermore stand as structural guarantees to combat 
any unfairness on the part of public authorities. Marcilla takes this point further and 
considers that any Law of such characteristics is non-discriminatory and likely to be 
applied in a true and sure manner by the public authorities. It also leads to legal 
equality, given that the legal principles involved are down the middle, with equality and 
legal certainty deemed absolutely necessary in order for individuals to be able to 
develop lifetime strategies as liberalism intends (Marcilla 2005). Individuals enjoy full 
autonomy as regards selecting projects for good living on a private scale; in public life, 
however, certain principles of justice must be agreed that are nowhere to be found in 
such projects (Dworkin 2001). The key deliberation, then, is that the equal attribution of 
individual rights must suffice to guarantee a diversity of democratic societies, 
promoting universal and formal respect of rights relating to negative freedom.  
 
Abstraction purports to guarantee stable legal order and thus to give rise to 
certainty and predictable Law (Zagrebelsky 2009). The formal requirement for legal 
regulations to be general in nature thus seems prima facie to be a requirement of the 
principle of equality, i.e for legislation to be set down as being applicable to an abstract 
individual. This means, in principle, that you cannot have laws that are constructed in a 
personal manner. Such Laws can only occur when there are proper grounds. We do not, 
however, simply have to make do with a logical-abstract structure to achieve this. The 
decisive factors are the criteria for selection used to determine the category or class of 
person or the scenarios to which the legal consequence provided for under such 
legislation will apply (Bentham 2004; Fernández Ruiz-Gálvez 2003). 
 
The fact that legal provisions are deemed general with regard to the intended 
subject and abstract with regard to the action they regulate has its origins in ideology 
rather than logic and has to do with equality as the purpose of Law, in that all are equal 
in the eyes of the Law. Insofar as the abstract nature of Law is concerned, this tends to 
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fulfilment of another purpose of Law, the legal certainty (Bobbio 1998). Thus if all 
legal provisions of any given system are, as Bobbio has said, to be both general and 
abstract, this can only in fact occur in an ideal model and in reality individual and 
specific regulations do in fact exist. One can therefore extrapolate this to say that if we 
were to combine the four principles we would have general and abstract regulations; 
general and specific regulations; particular and abstract regulations and particular and 
specific regulations (Bobbio 1998). We can therefore see that generality is a fact that 
contradicts legal regulation being directly specifically at any one category or type of 
agent. The very term abstract, for its part, also refers to a category or type of actions 
where the opposite is deemed to be anything specific (Bobbio 1990). 
 
3. TREND TOWARDS SPECIFICATION IN FAMILY LAW AND 
FAMILY RIGHTS  
Safety is intertwined nowadays with basic legal assets, and ensuring safety is 
deemed socially and politically necessary. Justice is gradually losing its ideal and 
abstract dimension and being shaped by the requirements that define its content in a 
social and democratic rule of Law. These issues are closely associated with the 
relationship between the public and private arenas (Béjar 1995; Esping-Andersen 1993; 
Flora and Heidenheimer 2000; Pérez Luño 2007). In this instance, legal certainty plays 
an informative role which is conclusive with regard to freedom, equality and solidarity, 
assumed under the legality arising out of fundamental rights, and this role guarantees 
the realisation of freedoms. Objectively speaking, certainty is governed by the structural 
and functional regularity of the legal system bringing about a perception of tranquillity 
and relief in knowing what one can rely on. The conditions for structural correction and 
guarantee of regular provision or drafting of rights, as well as functional correction, 
providing the guarantee that those rights will be fulfilled for all the persons to whom 
they apply, should therefore all concur together with regularity of action on the part of 
the official bodies charged with applying the legislation (Pérez Luño 19994). 
 
Actions by public authorities must, in this sense, provide assets and services that 
are indispensable for integrating individuals and groups within society; and at the same 
time, insofar that if such rights and freedoms were actually exercised this would ensure 
a minimum degree of wellbeing and bring about involvement at the community level, 
then what Jellinek has termed status positivus socialis would come into being. When 
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considering these views, it is absolutely necessary to evaluate the socio-economic issue; 
rights to benefits, in general, imply available financial reserves and must be interpreted 
by the public authorities and specified according to current political-economic models 
in force at any given time (Gomes Canotilho 1988; Jellinek 1905). 
 
The State must, in this regard, ensure and encourage individual and group 
initiatives and check they duly exercise their rights and obligations, helping them reach 
their potential, providing anything they may lack and substituting for them whenever 
this proves absolutely or partially impossible or if they are ever unable to meet their 
legal duties properly. Separately to those issues, one should also highlight the 
promotional role of the Welfare States and this enables us to see that the objectives are 
to be sought by trying to “render the desired action necessary, feasible and 
advantageous”. One of the most noteworthy points to emerge from the Welfare States is 
the multiplicity of legislation aimed at providing incentives and consisting of 
“promoting desired behaviours” with a difference between facilitating -which ranges 
from “grants, aid or financial contributions or help with loans”- and positive sanction - 
scenarios in which “highly conforming behaviour is rewarded or a tax exemption 
provided”-. Arising from that, it would be helpful if general theory on the rights of 
families and their members were built up by uniting the relationship of individuals and 
the public authorities together with the role played by private authorities thereby giving 
rise to two types of relationship: the relationship between individuals and private 
authorities and the relationship between public and private authorities (De Asís 1996).  
 
Certain difficulties have arisen in modern day society with regard to 
intergenerational and new forms of mediation have come into play between family 
members (cultural, material, economic, political, religious and legal). The structure, 
however, is the same as it has always been: from parents to offspring and offspring to 
parents, much like the circular nature of communication that encompasses us all, 
spouse, parents, children, brothers and sisters and other family members. A child’s first 
relationships are formed with the family members it lives with and then come friends, 
peers and relatives. Altruism, as an underlying assumption of solidarity, must be mutual 
although it is entirely up to the individual and the ethical values running through the 
family. When couples are in conflict with one another, however, such altruism tends to 
either completely or partially disappear (Bott 1990;  Donati 1993).   
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Rights-obligations can be said, from the point of view of efficacy, to be the 
containers of an irreducible factor and to be a socio-legal objective that Law must set 
into order to a minimally satisfactory degree. There is evidence to show that compliance 
with family obligations in the modern day family is based on the freedom to seek 
equilibrium and reconciliation with the principles of private autonomy and development 
of the individual personality from a background of solidarity. Regulations in force 
across European Member States acknowledge the equal rights and obligations of 
spouses and their relationships with their children, under the principle that obligations 
go hand in hand with the family position, in the case of separation or breakdown, or 
pursuant to the obligations previously incumbent on the obliged party.  This concept of 
solidarity is clearly expressed in matrimonial joint asset arrangements, in the duty to 
provide food as well as in the obligations a child should share when living at home with 
the family.  
 
There is general consensus with regard to the need for the family to be protected 
by public authorities and a substantial difference in the degree of attention given and the 
way duties and responsibilities are set down, the instruments used and the extent to 
which they are used. Some member States, such as France, have introduced an explicit 
policy, taking action for and on behalf of the family, without any common goals as 
reference points. Other Member States where no such policy exists, such as the United 
Kingdom, act without referring directly to it but rather indirectly, as the principles form 
an integral part of social services and social action (McLynn 2006; Rymsza 1996).  
 
Evidence of the above can be seen from the fact that family policy within the 
European Union borders comes in a variety of guises and has gone through different 
periods since its inception. The stages can be categorised as follows (Navarro, Negro 
and Pallarés 1992; Ribes 1990): 
 
The first stage lasted from the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth century 
up to 1918. The main feature of this period was its liberal nature, where it was left to the 
good intentions of business owners to pay employees having family obligations. 
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The second stage, running from 1918 to 1928, concerned compensation. social 
costs arising for provisions to families were shared among the various different business 
owners in any one particular industry or locality, not related to the number of children 
anyone had.  
 
Then came the third stage, which prevailed from 1928 onwards and under which 
provision was deemed compulsory, family benefits were extended and obligation to pay 
was imposed by Law.  
This all goes to show that just as in the field of general social policy, different 
positions exist with regard to family-State and as to how the State should act. Family 
social policies are restricted to carrying through the ideologies that were defined under 
traditional policies in each particular area: a) Social-democratic model (Denmark, 
Finland and Sweden; b) the corporativism model (Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands); c) the Southern European or Catholic model (Spain, 
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Portugal); and d) the British model (United Kingdom) 
(Botella 1997; Dumon 1987; Katz, Eekelaar and MacLean 2000). 
 
 4. SOME INSTANCES OF FAMILY RIGHTS  
 Taken together with the preceding paragraph, the most important family rights 
may be said to be: The right to health protection. Health is deemed to be a personal 
value having a transcendental effect on the family and arising out of cultural and moral 
principles. Health protection measures as provided for under Law are both preventative 
and curative and intended to maintain hygiene standards, eradicating poverty, 
unemployment and social exclusion, which are all proven to have a negative effect. 
National, regional and local authorities are the primary players and receive support from 
the European Union for efforts made by Member States in the field of public health, 
assistance in drawing up and carrying through objectives and strategies and contributory 
measures to guarantee protection strategies (Daniels and Sabin 1997; De Lora 2004; 
Dworkin 1993). 
 
In this sense, notwithstanding the tremendous differences at the organisation and 
financing levels, health systems are all experiencing a common increase in costs as an 
absolute value and proportionate to GNP. There is a noticeable tendency to divert part 
of public health financing to family homes. All Member States have social protection 
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measures to ensure that a very large proportion of the population is covered pursuant to 
principles of quality, fairness and accessibility. Social services are seen as aid agencies 
that take responsibility for managing services where financing provisions provided 
under Law are channelled.  
 
Health costs usually vary, however, depending on whether or not they include 
aspects such as social assistance services, health in schools or chronic disease. Chronic 
or long term disease requires special attention or home help, in the case of disabilities, 
that go hand in hand with financial considerations and create a need for education 
centres, nurseries, means of transportation etc. This problem is further compounded by 
the absence of any accepted international definition for the term health costs and due to 
the inherent difficulty of properly measuring the degree to which current systems in 
place are represented (Álvarez 2004).  
 
One should additionally make reference to the right-duty to work, which is not 
set down in writing as an obligation, but is rather a meta-legal value that requires 
interpretation with a Rule of Law in force, according to the statutory regulations 
governing the general economic situation. The same is true with regard to guaranteeing 
personal autonomy, with regard to the freedom to choose the type of work one wishes to 
do together with the freedom to change from one type to another or the right to an 
employment career path suited to the capability of each person.  
 
The salary or consideration on the part of the employer to the employee can be 
defined as the fruit of man’s work by means of which both he and his family subsist. 
Such remuneration must be equitable, i.e. fair, and sufficient to maintain an decent 
lifestyle providing dignified conditions on the material, social, cultural and spiritual 
level.  That is why we would again emphasise the fact that the family-work relationship 
is intrinsic, with the European population living on salaries, for the most part. Work is 
seen as a means to maintain the family and ensures that basic needs are covered. This 
translates to well-being in the home, bringing life to the home to which all contribute 
with their work. Work is therefore profoundly social from the savings and consumer 
spending viewpoint, not just as a means of production. The remuneration referred to 
should be sufficient to permit each individual person to attain their material and spiritual 
potential, to start a family, attend to its needs and save enough to build up the family 
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assets (Bernard 1995). There is an ethical basis to salary payment in that it produces a 
current debitum and a sense of ownership, in that it belongs to the employee in 
exchange for the work carried out.  
 
The fact that working time is limited has a dual dimension. One aspect is that 
spending time is a person’s right to enjoy free time, to rest and to be with the family; the 
other is the perception of a scarce commodity -work itself- as a collective right. 
Furthermore, Member States have not reached agreement as to the length of the working 
day, in the belief that the European community should effectively acknowledge the right 
to family time and therefore to set down a series of legal principles as to minimum 
working time, rest periods, holidays, weekend work and overtime. There is a clear need 
to keep work time allocation flexible and suited to company working conditions and 
dynamics.  
 
Secondly, insofar as the right to an education is concerned the starting premise is 
that the functions of education, with regard to social policy, centre around the use of a 
socialising role in order to guarantee equal opportunities. The task is a democratic one, 
preparing the child to play its part in society, and to exercise its rights and freedoms; in 
addition to the work involved in making sure that society moves forward (Palomeque 
1991; Sastre 1996). Described in this way it becomes obvious that one must educate 
individuals and provide them with overall training to prepare them to appreciate values, 
ordering rationality, and this is the idea behind the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (article 26.2) which provides: “the purpose of education is to fully 
develop an individual’s potential and to strengthen respect for fundamental rights; it 
should enhance understanding, tolerance and friendships between ethnic and religious 
groups; and promote the development of United Nations peace keeping activities”. 
 
Educational procedures serve to teach young people about acceptable behaviour 
and pass on knowledge that forms part of culture. They serve to teach students how to 
co-exist and to bring their own desires in line with common group values. The socio-
political aims of education should be to help the child acquire knowledge about its 
cultural surroundings, perfecting methods of adaptation aimed at improving culture as 
necessary. That is why merely technical and pragmatic style education must be flatly 
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rejected, creating as it does a person lacking in such fundamental values (Martínez de 
Pisón 2003). 
 
The grounds alluded to serve to support the idea that what one needs is 
equilibrium between acknowledging freedom of education and equal opportunities is a 
desired objective, rendered effective by compulsory measures and free basic schooling 
so that illiteracy can be eradicated and everyone can promote themselves. In this regard 
there should also be a balance between academic fees and family income that makes it 
possible to provide subsidised loans to those not receiving educational grants but who 
nevertheless have financial difficulties. Proper adaptation to current reality at any given 
time, combined with a clear vision for the future render it essential to achieve usefulness 
to society and scientific progress. Member States are aware that their economic policies 
inherently involve competitivity upheld by productions costs, dependant on innovation 
and creativity. Continuous retraining must also be guaranteed to raise awareness of new 
advances and theories. Information technologies and communications have become 
tools at the service of training (Berthélemy, Brunet and Jamoulle 1998; Esteban and 
González-Trevijano 2004). 
  
Thirdly, the right to housing stands out in that it is the location of the home, 
family life and activities and a family without a house-room is unthinkable. It has to do 
with family intimacy. The family home is of transcendental importance as it is the 
external expression of the tension between private and public life; between the house 
and the city of houses; between domestic reality and civilian society  
 
A home needs to have certain minimum conditions and to be a refuge from 
outside interference. The limitations of the home are defined according to the way it is 
used and the actions that take place there and the minimum living area for appropriate 
communal living of all who inhabit it must be reviewed. Having a decent home is, 
according to estimated parameters in the Member State settlement area, an additional 
pre-requisite together with the right to family regroupment (art. 10.3 Regulation 
1.612/68), pursuant to the appropriate needs and wellbeing of the family, so that it can 
live together and perform its functions in a proper manner. 
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Residence is a separate concept to housing and involves issues of transience and 
home address, implying habitual dwelling. The concept of habitual residence has been 
created in Law: the place where one’s interests are centred and rights and actions 
exercised, obligations complied with. Housing is therefore the dwelling where the 
family habitually resides, i.e. its effective centre of interests. Family home, housing, and 
habitual residence are different expressions encompassing realities that have a specific 
meaning (González Ordovás 2004).   
 
These ideas imply that housing is a family requirement. The task of Government 
authorities would consist either of making direct provision, such as building decent 
family homes, providing finance, purchasing and use of such homes or indirect 
provision by approving laws to make such homes available. The standards of decency 
and suitability of materials in that regard must also extend to the environment and make 
town planning allocation necessary (Corriente 1986; Pisarello 2003).   
 
5. ISSUES THAT REQUIRE FAMILY LAW AND FAMILY RIGHTS TO 
BE REDEFINED 
Cultural and ideological issues arise within Europe, due to its unique historical 
background, which are the outward expression of the different traditions, mentalities 
and social norm priorities and these, due to their very nature, impede harmonisation and 
the setting of objectives for convergence. It is therefore absolutely necessary to start out 
from the diversity of systems, cultures and cultural practices that have survived within 
the traditions and manner in which their peoples developed. Germany and France are 
respectively representative of authoritarianism and egalitarianism and continue to act as 
two opposing poles; British culture, individualistic per se, treats individuals according 
to their race, ethnic background and religion. This explains the fragmentation that 
exists, with its roots in such varied anthropological origins. The European democratic 
model combines British elements, respect for the German and French civil rights and, as 
Todd (Todd, 1995) has stated, we are faced in Europe with a variety of family types due 
to religious attributes, literacy, industrialisation, birth control and ideology.   
 
In turn, just as there is a relationship between national or regional political 
temperament and the ideological system, whether a society is agricultural or urban is 
another factor which affects the way the family group is structured. In the first instance, 
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practices with regard to inheritance and co-residence rules become highly formalised.  It 
is harder to perceive the transparency of overriding values in the city. Religion 
influences institutions and beliefs as well as individual activities, although 
secularisation has arisen out of industrialisation, urbanisation and modernisation.  There 
is a parallel between the feudal master family, with land ownership that meant they 
could stand up to the power wielded by priests and orthodox Protestantism (Northern 
Germany, central France and Sweden); between the absolute nuclear family and 
Armenian style Protestantism (the Netherlands and United Kingdom) (Hamilton 1995). 
Thus, if we take culture to mean the combination of spiritual, material, 
intellectual and sensorial factors that are characteristic of a society or social group, then 
Europe is a response to the values that justify its existence. This is because the Member 
States that comprise it have a unity of origin and interests. The policy of cooperation 
acknowledges the pluralism that exists and is intended to improve Member States’ 
knowledge of other European Community Member States and their information 
regarding European history and culture. The concept of Common European Heritage is 
based on a socio-political idea based on respect for the person and individual 
fundamental freedoms. The central focus is always the individual and, given that 
individuals are from families, then family social policy acquires special importance 
(Chabod 1992). 
 
On the other hand, political problems exist, in that the European Union has its 
origins in the desire to prevent armed conflict and wars between the States that comprise 
it although, in terms of the internal context of the European Union, the tendency is and 
has always been the defence of self-interest and there is therefore an urgent need to 
engage Europeans in building a Europe in which each accepts the differences of others, 
within a framework of tolerance and non-exclusion. While the lines of thought as to 
how that Europe can really be built are unclear, the starting point is that non-one can be 
excluded on racist, ideological, religious, social or national grounds, the differences of 
others must be accepted and educate to assimilate (Dahrendorf 1976). 
 
It is important to mention migratory movements to and from the European 
Union on this point, as well as between the various different Member States and regions 
which have become an increasingly important factor of demographic evolution since the 
mid-eighties. The Member States where migrants have settled can be divided into two 
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large areas: Northern Europe, comprised of Member States such as Germany, France, 
the United Kingdom and Belgium; and Southern Europe, including Italy, Spain, 
Portugal and Greece. There has always been a tradition of migration to the first group 
but the phenomenon of migration only appeared later on in the second group. The 
Northern Member States wish to achieve an integrated population and migrants are 
treated there by the same principles of equality as nationalised citizens. Parallel to this, a 
social policy comprising specific rights and adapted to each particular situation is 
beginning to be set down. Inequalities between national systems of social protection 
therefore justify the different conditions between migratory processes and social 
insertion support programmes. 
 
The end result of all these trends is that today’s society is multicultural and that 
certain problems arise out of the economic and social repercussions. The different 
European migration scenarios within the population can be classified as old 
immigration; new migratory flows; and specific groups (refugees, asylum claimants and 
illegal immigrants). There are more men that women and more young people than older 
people. Migrants are typically adult, with few children or old people, and often set up 
home in the new Member State (Lahav 1997).  
 
These categories highlight the need for new thinking to regulate family social 
policy. This problem can be overcome by promoting policies for inter-community 
relations as legal instruments to achieve judicial, economic and social stability bringing 
about equality of access to goods and services, with regard to finding work and decent 
housing (De Lucas 1999). 
 
The same can be said to occur politically as culturally and ideologically, i.e., the 
European Union must take diversity within the unity into consideration and should not 
just fall into the danger of simple juxtaposition, creating a conglomerate of systems; 
neither should it avoid diversity in an attempt to introduce uniformity by focussing on 
the ‘what’ of the end product rather than the ‘who’ (Rawls 2001). Integration of the 
European Union Member States therefore requires us to found common political ideals 
which can only become known and valued by reviewing the European roots that can 
explain how it came about. The objective would be to reinforce European Union 
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structures, rationalise decision-making mechanisms, and deepen the sentiment of 
belonging to the Union.  
 
Lastly, another kind of reason lies in economic grounds and particularly the 
repercussions of the socio-economic system on the way families are organised. Under 
the medieval rural economic system, women worked in agricultural, looked after the 
animals, took care of the home and reproduction. Services and goods produced in the 
home by the woman at home were intended for private consumption by the other family 
members. The housewife generated use values which, as they were consumed, meant 
that work efforts were partly reproduced. Over time, the arrival of urbanisation brought 
with it new lifestyles, habits and internal relationships, needs changed and the system 
was re-organised (Barrère-Maurisson 1987).  
 
There appears to be a direct relationship between production and human 
reproduction as a social phenomenon. The pre-modern model (numbers of offspring as 
production assets) has given way to the modern model (quality of offspring as an 
investment asset). The pre-modern family, living in rural homes, had a greater number 
of children than modern families, living in urban dwellings, given the time and money 
involved in raising and educating those children and further considering that the 
possibilities for each child to realise their potential in the future is continually 
decreasing due to the difficulties of finding employment. Industrialisation has meant 
that the family no longer comprises the basic means of work organisation although the 
imposed method of working still fulfils certain traditional economic functions in that 
work is seen as an individual position inserted into other productive groups (the factory, 
the company, the State). The family continues to be the economic grouping dedicated to 
genetic-human reproduction and out of which the future work force arises (Gil Calvo 
1997).  
 
Specialisation and the subsequent division of labour that this creates are co-
related with family factors in that each family member has its own task to carry out, the 
imposed rationalisation and organisation thereby implying a more efficient outcome. 
Such specialisation is dependent on cultural tradition, on masculine and feminine 
biological structure, despite the fact that women have joined the professional workforce 
and that the levels and types of education of the two sexes are increasingly similar. In 
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most cases the wages earned by the woman supplements the man’s income, in that the 
production tasks are becoming increasingly similar as the locations where the family 
produces its income has moved to the factory, the company, the shop, etc. And from the 
standpoint of family policy, the economy plays a major role affecting that policy, as can 
be seen from the fact that whenever the economy is not doing well public authorities 
take on fewer responsibilities (Gómez 1990). 
 
This is why we should review the problems involved in an aging population, the 
structure and make-up of families, the persistently high unemployment figures, the 
appearance of poverty processes and increasing cost of worldwide aid, where traditional 
poverty and modern poverty meet.   
      
6. CONCLUSION 
Insofar as the Member States of the European Union are concerned, some legal 
regulations have been set down by legal orders making provisions for the social interest 
surrounding the family. Family Law is essentially a national issue, centred on how they 
are constituted or the family pathology, parenting and parental authority. Family 
autonomy should be taken to mean the convergence of the private autonomies of the 
family members along a line of common interest, reached by agreement in a process of 
contractualisation of rights and obligations. National family law comes second to the 
internal regulations set up by the family group and in force within the privacy of the 
family home. The former only comes into play in the face of danger or inability to 
guarantee family objectives. Law contains indispensable regulations governing public 
order and the common good and these must respect aspects comprising the family itself. 
 
The State intervenes along basic lines to the extent that it is in its interests to 
preserve the family as an institution. Regulations can be seen as a system providing 
incentives that have a decisive effect on future actions, although it is law itself that sets 
down the content and specific scope and effects of the legal-family relationship (Garrido 
2000). Any agreement reached from the autonomous will of the parties must necessarily 
adapt to the limitations set down under the Legal System, in that legal powers arising 
out of legal-family relationships are deemed instrumental and are attributed in order to 
ensure the purposes provided for under that legal system and this cannot be left up to 
the independent criteria of individual citizens. The degree of difficulty arises from the 
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fact that families have very strong ethics which rely on moralistic and ideological 
issues, on religion, tradition and a value system. 
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